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Theories of contracting out offer contrasting perspectives on the noneconomic determinants 
of local government contracting. Some suggest ideological motives predominate, with 
contracting decisions reflecting the ideology of ruling parties. Others emphasise political 
motives, with governments responding to local preferences. In this paper, we draw on ideas 
about isomorphic pressures within organizational fields to examine whether institutional 
influences might also affect contracting behaviour. Using a spatial auto-regressive probit 
model, we evaluate whether mimetic pressures as well as ideological and political motives 
shape the decision to contract out service provision in English local governments. In addition, 
we analyse whether those factors also determine whether contracting local governments 
decide to contract with a commercial firm or a not-for-profit provider. The statistical results 
suggest that the decision to contract out is spatially dependent, and hence reflective of 
institutional forces. By contrast, political motives and market size considerations shape with 
whom local governments contract.  
Keywords: Contracting; institutional theory; local government; ideology; politics; spatial 
dependence.
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INTRODUCTION 
The varying commitment of public organizations to practices that policy-makers advocate is a 
major concern for many governments, especially those favouring privatization and service 
delivery innovations (Schmitt 2014; Shipan and Volden 2012). Local government 
contracting, in particular, is regarded as an important means to cut costs and improve the 
responsiveness of public services in countries across the globe (Bel and Warner 2008). 
Despite the on-going trend towards contracting out at the local level, not all governments 
contract out services to the same degree, with many preferring to retain services ‘in-house’. 
The motivations behind the decision to contract out (or not) are thus an important area of on-
going theoretical and empirical study that can cast light on the forces that shape decision-
making in public organizations (Baekkskov 2011). Allied to the technical, largely economic, 
arguments advanced in favour of contracting out, ideological and political motives have also 
been shown to be important determinants of externalisation (Bel and Fageda 2009).  At the 
same time, institutional influences could shape contracting decisions, ranging from direct 
regulation, to wider mimetic or normative pressures to adopt successful or appropriate 
practices.  
The policy diffusion literature has long pointed toward the role that institutional 
factors related to geographical proximity play in shaping public policy implementation 
(Money and Lee 1995; Berry and Berry 2007). In this paper, we seek to illustrate the relative 
importance of institutional isomorphism on public organizations by examining spatial 
dependence in the contracting behaviour of English local governments. First, we supplement 
the analysis of ideological and political influences on contracting out, with an evaluation of 
institutional pressures on the decision to contract out. Second, we explore whether 
institutional, ideological or political influences are responsible for the decision to contract 
with a commercial firm or a not-for-profit service provider.  
3 
 
According to Di Maggio and Powell (1983), organizations are profoundly affected by 
the institutional forces that surround them, which lead them to adopt similar strategies, 
structures, and processes in order to be perceived as legitimate. These ‘isomorphic’ pressures 
take three main forms: coercive (i.e. rules and regulations), mimetic (i.e. benchmarking 
competition) and normative (i.e. shared values and norms). Organizations can be coerced into 
adopting certain practices, seek to mimic those practices that are perceived to be successful, 
or adopt practices that are generally regarded as “the right thing to do”. Often organizations 
experience all three forms of isomorphic pressure (Matten and Moon 2008). For local 
governments, coercive pressures may come from superordinate authorities, especially higher 
levels of government, mimetic pressures from a desire to keep up with one’s neighbours, and 
normative pressures from a wider climate of received wisdom. Taken in combination, these 
isomorphic pressures are likely to result in governments increasingly resembling each other, 
especially where geographical proximity is high.    
Although evidence on the ideological and political motives shaping local government 
contracting is gradually mounting, few studies evaluate whether institutional influences play 
a role in contracting decisions (e.g. Hefetz et al. 2012; Villadsen et al. 2010). Still fewer 
analyse spatial dependence in contracting behaviour (for a partial exception see Bivand and 
Szymanski 2000). Yet, research suggests local government management practices are 
influenced by isomorphic pressures at the field level (Ashworth et al. 2009; Villadsen 2013) 
and that local policy decisions are often spatially dependent (Brueckner 1998). Hence, there 
may be good reason to expect geographical proximity to influence contracting decisions. In 
this paper, we seek to address the following questions: Do pressures to adopt legitimate 
organizational forms influence the contracting behaviour of local governments? In particular, 
do governments copy the contracting practices of their neighbours? And, to what extent are 
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institutional, ideological and political influences responsible for the choice of contractor, as 
well as the decision to contract out?  
To answer these questions, we carry out statistical analysis of the contracting out of 
leisure services by English local governments in 2007. A spatial auto-regressive probit model 
is applied to secondary data on local government contracting in order to determine the 
relative importance of institutional, ideological and political factors on the decision to 
contract out and on the choice of service provider. In the following section, we explore how 
institutional influences might lead local governments to mimic the contracting behaviour of 
their neighbours, before going on to reflect on the ideological and political influences that 
arguably shape contracting behaviour. Thereafter, we introduce the data and methods used to 
carry out the study, and discuss the statistical results. We conclude the paper by considering 
the implications of the findings from our study.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTING  
Classic theories of bureaucracy and public administration emphasised that due process and 
administrative efficiency were the key goals shaping organizational decision-making (see, for 
example, Gulick and Urwick 1937; Simon 1976). Building on the insights of organizational 
sociologists, proponents of the “new institutionalism”, however, argue that the primary 
objective of organizational decision-making in the public (and private) sectors is not 
necessarily better substantive performance, but greater legitimacy in order to meet the 
expectations of key stakeholders in the environment (Scott 2014). Critically, new institutional 
theory suggests the pursuit of legitimacy is likely to encourage a tendency toward conformity 
across benchmarking organizations in the general operations and management practices that 
they adopt (Ammons and Roenigk 2015). According to Di Maggio and Powell (1983) the 
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process by which this occurs can be characterised as institutional isomorphism, and is driven 
by coercive, mimetic and normative pressures towards homogeneity in organizations 
confronting similar circumstances. Coercive pressures are embedded in the rules and 
regulations to which organizations must submit, mimetic pressures in the best practices that 
diffuse throughout organizational populations, with normative pressures encapsulated in the 
attitudes of stakeholders regarding appropriate organizational behaviour. From this 
perspective, technical organizational considerations are ultimately of less importance than 
political ones relating to the institutional environment.   
Within the local government context in England, institutional isomorphism may have 
been the result of the regulatory regimes that have been implemented by UK central 
government (Ashworth et al. 2009). Both Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT), 
advocated by the national Conservative administration in the 1990s, and Best Value, a New 
Labour regime of the 2000s, placed statutory obligations on local governments to consider 
contracting services out to external contractors. The Best Value regime, in particular, was a 
statutory framework for the management of local government services, which incorporated a 
strong expectation in favour of the outsourcing of service delivery (Ashworth et al. 2009). To 
ensure that local governments considered alternative modes of service provision, Best Value 
required them to review their functions by: challenging why and how a service is being 
provided; comparing performance with that of other organizations; consulting with a range of 
stakeholders in the setting of new performance measures; and competing for enhanced 
performance, by securing efficient and effective services. As such, it represents an especially 
apt policy context for exploring the potential salience of institutional influences on the 
decision-making of public organizations. 
Local governments arguably operate in a competitive environment in which it is 
important to raise additional tax revenue by attracting residents and businesses to the local 
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area (Tiebout 1956). The most straightforward, and in principle least risky, way to enhance 
local government tax and spending efficiency is to copy the service delivery characteristics of 
one’s neighbours – indeed, the policy diffusion literature has long pointed towards the 
propensity of governments to adopt the policies of nearby governments (see Money and Lee 
1995; Berry and Berry 2007). Crucially, mimesis is a product of external institutional 
pressures to perform as well as internal technical ones. Villadsen (2013) argues that such 
mimetic institutional forces are especially likely in a horizontal peer network, where 
performance comparison between peers highlights performance gaps that potentially threaten 
the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of key stakeholders. Local governments may 
therefore mimic the management practices of their neighbours to reduce the uncertainty 
around the implications of performance failure.  In fact, comparison-of-performance-
benchmarking across the sector, as promoted under the Best Value duties of challenge, 
compare, consult and compete, was underpinned by the threat to contract out ‘failing’ local 
services to external providers or other local authorities (Martin 2000). Thus, strong mimetic 
and coercive forces combined to influence the service delivery choices of English local 
governments during the period when Best Value was in operation. 
At the same time as having strong mimetic and coercive effects, the Best Value 
regime also had important normative institutional effects, reflected in a ‘defensive’ approach 
to benchmarking by local governments that was focused on the adoption of those practices 
most likely to be deemed legitimate, rather than those likely to improve services (Bowerman 
et al. 2001). This process became institutionally embedded through the formation of 
benchmarking clubs that enabled local governments to share and copy those approaches to 
service delivery that appeared to meet the external accountability demands of Best Value. In 
this respect a ‘logic of appropriateness’ could be said to have underpinned the response of 
English local governments to their regulatory environment as much as a ‘logic of 
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consequences’ (Entwistle 2011). These normative pressures merged with mimetic ones, as 
benchmarking clubs tended to follow a pattern of geographical proximity, with lessons 
learned about contracting out being drawn from regional service improvement clusters.  
In addition to being driven by coercive competitive effects and normative pressures, 
mimesis amongst public organizations is likely to be especially strong where comparable 
performance information is widely available and utilised by both superordinate authorities 
and the citizenry to hold those organizations to account. The Best Value regime was 
accompanied by the development of a suite of performance indicators for just this purpose. 
Moreover, institutional pressures towards the adoption of ‘legitimate’ management practices 
were further entrenched through the introduction of the ‘Beacon Council’ award scheme by 
UK central government at the same time as Best Value. This scheme aimed to ‘recognize the 
best performing councils and spread best practice’ (Ashworth et al. 2009: 174), and actively 
promoted mimesis on normative grounds. Given the confluence of coercive, mimetic and 
normative institutional forces surrounding English local governments during the 2000s, it 
seems highly likely that contracting out at that time reflected mimicry behaviour and that this 
behaviour was spatially dependent.  
 Tobler’s (1970) first law of geography indicates that ‘everything is related to 
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things’, and there is good reason 
for anticipating that this will apply in the case of local government’s decision to contract 
services out. Previous studies have highlighted spatial dependence in local policy decisions 
relating to urban growth (Brueckner 1998) and service innovations (Rincke 2006). In the face 
of strong institutional pressures to benchmark themselves against appropriate and successful 
management practices, it seems highly probable that the decision to contract out for any 
given local government will be influenced by the choices made by its neighbours. Not only 
are neighbouring governments potential competitors for mobile residents, they are also likely 
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to be members of the same benchmarking and service improvement networks. Thus, where 
there is uncertainty about what works for service delivery, the strategic risks associated with 
striking a solitary path can be averted by copying one’s nearest neighbours. Nevertheless, 
institutional influences are not the only factors likely to shape local government decision-
making, and we turn now to other potential noneconomic influences on contracting 
behaviour. 
 
IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON CONTRACTING 
The conventional motivation local governments have to contract out is the belief that this will 
induce cost savings. According to public choice and property rights theories (Alonso et al. 
2015), contracting out enhances efficiency because it implies transferring service production 
away from a public sector monopoly to a scenario where multiple providers compete for 
business. In this scenario, as Domberger and Jensen (1997: 68) emphasise, the market “is 
defined by the contract specification, and the bidding process resembles an auction.” This 
may spur an ex-ante competition, whereby contracted services are those determined in 
advance to be provided at the lowest cost – something more likely to happen where there are 
many potential contactors (Bel and Fageda 2009). Other economic factors, such as economies 
of scale (Zafra-Gomez et al. 2013) and fiscal pressures (Bel and Fageda 2007, 2009) have 
also been suggested as drivers of contracting – though are less relevant for our analysis as 
during the study period English local governments benefited from central government grants 
that increased across the board.  
In addition to economic considerations, public choice theorists point towards the 
importance of ideological and political influences on government contracting (Bel and 
Fageda 2009). As regards ideology, issues such as policy choices and politicians’ behaviour 
have been addressed by the public choice literature. In particular, the Citizen Candidate 
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model predicts that the ideology of the ruling party is a key factor when explaining 
contracting out decisions: left wing parties are considered less likely to contract out while 
right wing parties are linked with higher levels of contracting (Osborne and Slivinski 1996). 
In theory, left-wing parties favour government intervention in the economy and society, 
whereas right-wing parties prefer the free market as a mechanism for allocating goods and 
services. While this idea is supported by several previous studies (e.g. Elinder and Jordahl 
2013; Picazo-Tadeo et al. 2012; Sundell and Lapuente 2012), to date it has not been 
systematically tested in the UK, even though the local government system in the country 
experienced a wave of top-down reforms  advocating the contracting out of public services. 
Within the English context, although there has been some ideological convergence 
between the main left-wing (Labour) and right-wing (Conservative) parties, the similarities in 
the policy positions adopted by the two parties can be overstated (Smith 2010). In general, 
the Labour Party has continued to favour greater state involvement in the provision of public 
services than the Conservative Party, and during the 2000s invested large sums of public 
money in an effort to improve service quality. The ideological differences between Labour 
and the Conservative Party could therefore matter for local government contracting, because 
local, like national, politics continues to be dominated by these parties. These differences 
might also shape the choice of contractor. In particular, Labour controlled governments that 
‘bite the bullet’ and choose to contract out may still prefer the societal ethos of a not-for-
profit provider, to the commercialism of a private firm. 
In terms of politics, the standard Downsian model challenges the assumption of the 
citizen candidate model that ideological differences generate policy divergence. From this 
perspective, policy choices are conditioned by the preferences of the median voter rather than 
the ideological pronouncements of political parties. Factors such as voters’ and citizens’ 
preferences about the role of government are considered potentially important non-economic 
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influences on the contracting out decision (see Bel and Fageda 2007, 2009). The evidence 
supporting the Downsian model is rather more mixed than that for the citizen candidate 
model, with several studies finding no evidence of political motivations for contracting out 
(e.g. Brudney et al. 2005; Elinder and Jordahl 2013), and a smaller number finding a 
connection between citizens’ attitudes and privatisation (e.g. Hefetz and Warner 2003). 
Nevertheless, the assumption that local governments’ contracting behaviour is shaped by the 
demands of the median voter seems reasonable given that local government expenditures 
have long been found to be responsive to citizen demand (Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1982).  
In the case of England, the attitudes of voters towards public sector expenditures, and 
the state funding and provision of public services has tended to follow party political lines, 
with Labour voters most committed to state provision and Conservative voters least 
committed (Clarke et al. 2004). Labour voters are also more likely to support and belong to 
trade unions and professional associations that are hostile to contracting out at the local level 
(Foster and Scott 1998). As such, voting behaviour represents an effective means for 
capturing the effects of the median voter on local governments’ propensity to contract out. 
Thus, whatever their ideological predilections, ruling parties serving populations with a large 
proportion of Labour voters may be less likely to contract services out. By extension, where 
governments do decide to contract services out, Labour voters seem more likely to support 
externalisation to not-for-profit providers than the employment of commercial firms.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA  
To address the question of what factors explain contracting out in English local governments, 
we follow a similar approach to Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2012) and deploy a sequential decision-
making model. The model consists of series of binary choices, which implies that local 
governments must first choose whether or not to contract services out, before then deciding 
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with whom they contract if they choose to externalise service provision. The first choice is 
coded in the form of an observed binary variable (y1) taking a value of 1 if the local 
government decides to contract out to commercial firms or not-for-profit providers and 0 for 
in-house delivery. Once this decision is made, and provided that the local government 
decides to contract out the service (y1=1), local governments must decide whether to sign a 
contract with a commercial firm or with a not-for-profit provider. This second choice is 
coded again as a binary variable (y2) which takes a value of 1 if the local governments 
contract with commercial firms and a value of 0 when contracting with not-for-profit 
providers.   
Following Liao (1994), this sequential model can be estimated using a series of probit 
models, which rely on the assumption that the probability of a given choice at each step is 
independent from the probability of a given choice at other steps. This should hold in our 
case since both variables, i.e., y1 and y2, are conceptually different – the first relates to the 
initial decision to contract out, while the second relates to the subsequent outcome of the 
contract tendering process. In addition to being conceptually distinct, y1 and y2 are 
statistically independent – the correlation between errors computed after standard probit 
estimations was not found to be different from zero. Since there may be spatial dependence 
among English local governments when adopting contracting out policies driven by the 
institutional environment in which they operate we use a Spatial Auto-Regressive (SAR) 
variant of the conventional probit model. The SAR model is considered as the baseline 
specification when the value of the dependent variable is jointly determined with that of 
closer spatial units (Elhorst 2009).  
To overcome the potential for heteroscedasticity to bias the estimates, we adopt the 
Bayesian approach to estimating SAR probit models developed by LeSage (2000) and 
extended in Lesage and Pace (2009). This consists of a Bayesian simulation using a Markov 
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Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method based on the Gibbs sampler. The Bayesian approach to 
estimating SAR probit models treats the binary observed choices in y1 and y2  as indicators of 
the latent utility (or profit) of the service delivery form chosen by local governments (y1* and 
y2*). Hence, the decision to contract out would be made when the utility of contracting versus 
in-house delivery is not negative. Similarly, there is another latent utility underlying the 
decision to sign a contract with commercial firms instead of not-for-profit providers. Like 
many sequential response models, we have unbalanced observations across steps, i.e., local 
governments who decide to keep service provision in-house at the first step are not evaluated 
any further, thus observations from those local governments keeping in-house delivery are 
dropped at the second stage. Formally, this approach can be written as: 
𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 = �1,     𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 00,    𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖∗ < 0�                                                                        (1)                                          
 
 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 = �1,     𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 00,    𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖∗ < 0
𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦1 = 0 �                                                                         (2) 
 
This sequential model can be represented linearly as two independent equations of the 
following form: 
𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖
∗ =  𝜌𝜌1� 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁1
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖
∗ + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖,             𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛)                           (3) 
  
𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝜌𝜌2� 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁2
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖
∗ + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖,             𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛)    (4) 
 
where 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖∗  reflects the latent unobserved utility associated with contracting out, and 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖∗  the 
utility associated with contracting with a commercial firm rather than a not-for-profit 
provider in local government i, wij is an element of the spatial matrix, W reflecting the 
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relative connectivity between local governments, ρ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient, Xi 
the ith observation on P variables explaining contracting, and εit the remainder disturbance 
term. We expect ρ to be positive if mimetic institutional pressures are a relevant factor when 
adopting contracting out policies. 
The spatial matrix W is a non-negative N x N matrix, where an element wij has a value 
greater than 0 if local governments i and j are connected, and 0 otherwise (local governments 
are not considered to be connected with themselves, thus the diagonal elements of W are 
equal to 0). In this paper, we follow previous studies on spatial policy dependence and choose 
a spatial matrix based on geographical proximity, since policy dependence processes, such as 
mimesis or emulation, might be more likely to occur between nearby observations (Beck et 
al. 2006). Broadly speaking, regional policy emulation arises because policy makers and 
citizens more easily “analogize” to local or state governments in the same region, whether 
through personal experience or because neighbouring jurisdictions are more likely to share 
similar economic, social, and environmental circumstances (Mooney and Lee, 1995: 665; 
Berry and Berry, 2007). Due to this predilection for “analogization”, the likelihood of a local 
government adopting any given policy may increase when its nearest neighbours adopt that 
policy. We thus operationalize the spatial matrix by adopting a row-normalized matrix where 
wij=1 if local government j is among the k nearest neighbours of local government i, where k 
is the number of nearest neighbours. Following LeSage and Pace (2009: Chapter 6) we select 
the appropriate k by estimating models based on varying numbers of nearest neighbours and 
then we compute the models’ Bayesian posterior probabilities, with higher probabilities 
reflecting superior model fit.  
It should be noted, however, that similarities between local governments leading to 
isomorphic mechanisms may arise from forces besides geographical distance. In particular, 
some authors have stressed the importance of ideological similarity, suggesting that the 
14 
 
diffusion effect of policy adoption by one government will be greatest on nearby 
governments sharing the ideological preferences of an adopter (e.g. Grossback et al., 2004). 
We explored this possibility by constructing a spatial matrix where wij=1 if two local 
governments shared a ruling party (Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat), but found no 
evidence of spatial dependence using this ideological weighting matrix (available on request), 
adding further confidence in our selection of a geographical spatial matrix. 
 
Study Context 
The dataset has been collected from English local governments. These are elected bodies, 
with a Westminster-style cabinet system of political management, which is usually made up 
of senior members of the ruling political party. English local governments receive 
approximately two-thirds of their income from the central government, and so their decision-
making is heavily influenced by national level policy and regulatory frameworks. In terms of 
service delivery, they are multi-purpose authorities delivering services education, social care, 
land-use planning, waste management, public housing, leisure and culture, and welfare 
benefits. In 2007, there were 386 local governments of five types. 32 London boroughs, 36 
metropolitan boroughs, and 46 unitary authorities mostly in urban areas delivering all of the 
services listed above; and in rural areas 34 county councils administering education and 
social services, and 238 district councils providing housing, leisure and cultural services.  
We investigate contracting out of public leisure provision, which is a service that 
appropriately reflects the emergence of a mixed economy of service delivery, where public 
agencies are increasingly seen to contract out parts of their services to other providers. For 
the purposes of our analysis, we focus on the year 2007 as this was the final year in which the 
Best Value regime was fully operational, and so represents the culmination of nearly two 
decades of regulatory effort to encourage English local governments to consider contracting 
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services out and to compare themselves with their neighbouring authorities. In this respect, 
we are able to capture institutional influences on contracting behaviour in a way in which it 
has not been possible to do following the replacement of Best Value with a more informal 
regulatory regime. Because we focus on contracting out of local leisure services, county 
councils are not included in a sample of 335 local governments that due to missing data also 
omits a small number of district councils. 
In 2007, approximately 1% of the local government annual budget (£1 billion) was 
spent on providing sports facilities, such as leisure centres, swimming pools and playing 
fields to the local community. This is roughly the same as the money spent on libraries and is 
equivalent to about half the money spent on waste management services. It is a service for 
which there is a large market of potential external providers and is indicative of those public 
sector services that face increasing prominence of external agencies (private and not-for-
profit) entering the sector to capitalize on opportunities in service delivery (Hodgkinson and 
Hughes 2014). Information regarding local governments’ contracting of service provision 
was obtained from The Leisure Database Company (TLDCi) for 2007. This database contains 
information about the management model of each facility run by all the local governments in 
England (i.e. in-house, commercial firm, not-for-profit provider). 
 
Dependent Variables 
As previously stated, the dependent variable in equation 3 takes a value of 1 if the local 
government decides to contract out and 0 for in-house delivery. Almost 81% of English local 
governments use only one delivery form for their leisure service provision (in-house, 
commercial firm or not-for-profit provider), with the remaining 19% using a combination of 
these methods. A local government with a mixed management model is considered to be a 
‘contractor’ if over 50% of its facilities were managed by external contractors. In equation 4, 
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the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the local government provides the service through 
a commercial firm(s), and 0 if the service is delivered through a not-for-profit provider(s). 
9.4% of the ‘contractor’ sample use a combination of both methods, so we consider a local 
government as a ‘privatizer’ if over 50% of the facilities were managed by commercial firms. 
The spatial distribution of contracting out versus in-house service delivery is shown in 
Figure 1A, with geographical clustering (or spatial dependence) evident in London and the 
South East of England. There is also evidence of spatial dependence in the Bristol area, the 
Manchester area and in the local governments bordering Scotland. Figure 1B shows the 
spatial distribution of commercial firms versus not-for-profit providers. Though it seems 
there are some geographical clusters in contracting with not-for-profit providers, particularly 
in the North and South East of England, the spatial association among observations for 
privatisation is not as clear as for the decision to contract out. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Contracting Determinants 
The Xi matrix includes a set of local ideological, political and economic factors that may 
influence the adoption of contracting out policies. Our source of data on these variables is a 
compilation of publications (e.g. Department of Communities and Local Government 2008; 
Office for National Statistics 2003; Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2002; 2003; Rallings 
and Thrasher 2003; 2007). Since our empirical approach does not allow all of the explanatory 
variables to be measured at the time the decision regarding the management of each service 
facility was taken, we take averaged values of several explanatory variables for 2000-2007 or 
for the closest election/census year. 
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To evaluate the influence of ideology when implementing contracting policies, we 
include in our model a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the Labour party holds the 
local government or controls a majority of the cabinet posts in 2007 – a figure all but constant 
from 2000 (details available on request). The prediction is that left majorities will make use 
of contracting and/or private firms to a lesser extent than right majorities. 
As regards politics, five measures are selected to gauge whether the choices of local 
policy-makers might be influenced by citizens’ preferences about the size and role of 
government: first, we measure the averaged percentage share of the vote gained by the 
Labour Party in the local elections between 2001 and 2007. Local residents voting Labour are 
expected to have a ‘collectivist’ disposition favouring in-house or non-private forms of 
service delivery (see Clarke et al. 2004). Second, we include the total local government 
expenditure per capita, averaged between 2001 and 2007 to gauge local residents preferences 
for the role of government; in municipalities with higher service needs (and therefore higher 
expenditure), local residents may be less likely to support privatization (Kodrzycki 1994; 
Brudney et al. 2005). Finally, more vulnerable citizens are thought to favour government 
provision of public services, particularly low income citizens and ethnic minorities (Brudney 
et al. 2005). To account for this, we measure the rate of deprivation within the local 
population averaged between 2000 and 2007, and two dimensions of the diversity of service 
needs: ethnic and social class diversity. The proportions of the different ethnic and social sub-
groups within the local population (e.g. Indian and Routine Occupations) identified in the 
2001 UK national census was squared, and the sum of the squares was subtracted from 
10,000, with a higher level of diversity reflected in a higher score.  
To control for economic influences on contracting out decisions three variables are 
selected. First, the degree of competition among potential service providers is measured using 
a dichotomous variable coded 1 for those governments serving urban populations and 0 for 
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those serving rural populations. This variable was based on the urban-rural administrative 
area classification used by UK central government (see Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
2002). Second, we include the population of municipalities to test whether economies of 
scale influence the contracting out decision. Urban indices and population figures have been 
extensively used in the empirical literature on contracting out (Bel and Fageda 2007, 2009). 
In addition, we also consider the possibility that population growth could overload the service 
delivery capacity of local governments, leading them to use contracting to meet increased 
demand (Brudney et al. 2005). To account for this overload effect we include in our model a 
variable measuring population growth based on census data. Descriptive statistics for all the 
variables used in our models are reported in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
RESULTS 
From a Bayesian perspective, statistical inference can be derived from an analysis of the 
posterior distribution, which can be approximated using curve estimation methods. Thus, 
figures 2 and 3 show the posterior densities of the coefficient estimates for both models, 
approximated by kernel density estimation based on the bandwidth rule of thumb proposed 
by Silverman (1986). In order to further facilitate the interpretation of results we also present 
a numerical summary of the posterior, i.e. posterior means and standard deviations in table 2, 
along with Bayesian p-levels, for the statistical models. These measure whether the 
coefficient is sufficiently different from zero. Following LeSage and Pace (2009), this 
statistic, though contrary to Bayesian convention, should be comparable to the conventional 
p-level associated with the t-statistic from the non-spatial probit models (see also Gelman et 
al. 1995). MCMC sampling procedures for both equations are based on 10 000 draws with 
the first 1000 draws excluded to account for the burn-in period of the sampler. The 
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estimations were computed in Matlab using James LeSage’s spatial econometrics toolbox, 
downloaded from www.spatial-econometrics.com, May 2014. Estimations computed with 
2000 and 5000 draws and different burn-in periods gave basically the same results. 
The number of steps for the Gibbs sampler has been set to 10, which is standard for 
Bayesian probit approaches. We set the prior hyperparameter to 4, which reflects a prior 
belief in heteroskedasticity (LeSage and Pace 2009). In addition to the discussed Bayesian 
approach to SAR probit models, we report standard probit estimates ignoring spatial policy 
dependence to benchmark the robustness of the results to different model specifications.  
 
The Contracting Out Decision 
The first objective of this empirical analysis is to test the factors influencing the decision to 
contract out service provision. Regarding ideology, the results suggest that local governments 
with a Labour majority are no more likely to contract out than those local governments with 
Conservative or Liberal Democrat majorities, which might be interpreted as a sign of policy 
convergence on the decision to contract out. Our findings also suggest that citizens’ 
preferences and economic factors are not affecting the choice between contracting out or in-
house provision. On the other hand, the posterior mean of the spatial lag coefficient (ρ) is 
positive (0.39) and the posterior density is clearly centred away from zero which, along with 
the reported Bayesian p-level (0.012),  strongly suggests the presence of spatial dependencies 
among the neighbouring local governments.  The evidence of positive spatial dependence 
means that the decision to contract out (or keep in-house) in local government i appears to be 
influencing that decision in a neighbour local government j.  This result, alongside the lack of 
statistical significance for the other explanatory variables, suggests that institutional 
isomorphism is at work in shaping local governments’ decision-making.  
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The importance of mimetic pressures when explaining contracting out might be a 
consequence, in our context, of the regulatory regime faced by English local governments. 
Central government encouraged local governments to avoid in-house provision of services if 
a more efficient provider or management model existed, with serious consequences if 
authorities failed to challenge existing models of provision and compare themselves with 
other organizations. Hence, coercive and mimetic institutional forces may well be operating 
in tandem in this instance. That said, in a scenario of uncertainty about outcomes, it is 
conceivable that mimetic forces alone may explain the adoption of management practices for 
which there is insufficient empirical evidence of performance benefits (Ashworth et al. 2009). 
Or, put differently, for some local governments the safest strategy for resolving the ‘make or 
buy?’ decision may simply be to emulate the policy adopted by one’s neighbour, especially 
given the wider institutional forces indicating that contracting out is “the right thing to do”. 
While our findings are strongly suggestive of spatial dependence in the contracting behaviour 
of English local governments, further research is required to determine the precise interplay 
between the different institutional forces shaping the decision-making of councils. In-depth 
case studies in the service departments of local governments could, for example, highlight the 
extent to which the decision to adopt the practices of their neighbours is driven by coercive 
and/or normative pressures.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Commercial Firm or Not-for-profit Provider? 
The estimation of the equation explaining the factors influencing the choice of service 
contractor offers a completely different picture to the equation modelling the decision to 
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contract out. Now, we find no evidence of spatial dependence. Although the posterior mean 
for ρ takes a positive value (about 0.25), a relatively large fraction of the posterior mass takes 
negative values which, along with the reported Bayesian p-level (0.132), do not permit us to 
clearly conclude that ρ is greater than zero.  This suggests that local governments make the 
decision to sign a contract with either a private firm or a not-for-profit provider independently 
of the choices of their neighbours. With respect to the ideology variable, we find no evidence 
that local governments led by the Labour party are more reluctant to contract with 
commercial firms than not-for-profit providers: the coefficient for Labour majority is 
negative, as expected, but not statistically significant. In this line, the coefficient for total 
service expenditure is also negative as expected but, again, not statistically significant. By 
contrast, local residents’ political preferences seem to be an important determinant of the 
choice of contractor – the posterior mean for Labour votes is negative and centred away from 
zero.  
Local governments with higher Labour vote shares appear to be more likely to 
contract with not-for-profit providers than with commercial firms, which points towards the 
responsiveness of local governments to the views of local residents. Contrary to much of the 
extant literature this suggests that the contracting choices of local policy-makers are more 
likely to be influenced by public opinion than by the ideology of the party that they represent. 
In line with previous studies, our findings also indicate that urban local governments are 
more likely to contract with commercial firms (Warner and Hefetz 2003) – the posterior 
mean for the urban variable is positive and centred away from zero. This may be due to the 
larger number of potential bidders in urban areas, but also because commercial firms are 
more likely to provide the service in urban areas where, a priori, there might be a larger 
number of potential customers. In line with this finding, the posterior mean for population 
growth is also positive and centred away from zero. This anticipated higher market share, 
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therefore, may attract a larger number of commercial firms (Girth et al. 2012) Overall, it is 
evident from the findings that once the decision to contract out has been taken, there remain 
important political and economic influences at play that ultimately impact the outcome of the 
‘buy’ decision (i.e. whether contracting-out to commercial firms or not-for-profit providers). 
Again, further qualitative research could cast light on the ways in which noneconomic 
motives shape contracting decisions. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have analysed the determinants of contracting out in a competitive public 
service setting in English local governments, supplementing the focus on ideological and 
political influences in prior studies with an emphasis on institutional influences. In doing so, 
we utilise a spatial auto-regressive probit model to capture patterns of policy diffusion 
attributable to coercive and mimetic pressures towards institutional isomorphism. Our 
findings suggest that institutional factors play an important role in shaping the contracting out 
decision, but that the choice of contractor is driven by political and economic considerations. 
There is evidence of spatial dependence in the decision to contract out service provision in 
English local governments, and evidence that local governments serving populations with a 
‘collectivist’ disposition prefer to contract with not-for-profit providers rather than 
commercial firms. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications. 
Firstly, we provide strong statistical evidence that the decision-making of public 
organizations may be the product of institutional isomorphism. Contracting out decisions, in 
particular, may not simply reflect the imperatives of the technical operating environment, but 
be the result of forces within the institutional environment. We have been able to illustrate 
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patterns of institutional isomorphism by utilising spatial statistical techniques. Nevertheless, 
recent developments in new institutional theory point towards the importance of the “logics” 
that shape the decisions of key stakeholder groups (Dunn and Jones 2010) and the role played 
by institutional entrepreneurs in “making things happen” (Tracey, Phillips and Jarvis 2011). 
Future quantitative and qualitative studies of the institutional influences on the behaviour of 
public organizations should therefore seek to analyse the extent to which isomorphism may 
reflect the operation of wider professional logics – amongst contract managers or those 
managers working within discrete policy fields such as leisure services, for example. It would 
also be valuable to investigate the extent to which “entrepreneurial” decision-makers take 
their cues from the management practices of neighbouring organizations and the institutional 
work they undertake to “sell” mimesis to internal stakeholders.  
Secondly, our study confirms the insights of the policy diffusion literature regarding 
the salience of geographical proximity for public policy implementation. It is therefore 
essential to consider spatial dependence in models of local government contracting, and that 
institutional influences may explain the presence of geographical clustering of organizational 
behaviour. Mimesis driven by uncertainty, especially, may be particularly important when 
understanding of the relationship between practice and performance is unclear; such as is the 
case in leisure provision (Audit Commission 2006). Thus, future studies of the decision-
making of public service organizations should always seek to ascertain whether there are 
spatial patterns reflected in geographical proximity and driven by institutional pressures.  
Thirdly, our study suggests that politics may determine the choice of contractor 
selected by local governments, even though it may not influence the decision to contract out. 
Wherever possible, subsequent research should aim to establish the relative salience of 
institutional, ideological and political influences on whether local governments choose to 
contract with the private or not-for-profit sector once the decision to contract out has been 
24 
 
taken. There are other local public service markets in England (and elsewhere) that exhibit 
the kind of supplier diversity that facilitates the more in-depth analysis of contracting 
behaviour that we undertake here. Contracting out of elderly care services, in particular, also 
involves a wide range of private and not-for-profit providers and accounts for vast sums of 
money in the UK local government system (Bode 2006). Evidence on the determinants of 
contracting in this service would therefore cast valuable further light on this important issue. 
Despite the strengths of our analysis, there are a number of limitations in our study 
design, which provide opportunities for further research. First, although we offer a rare test of 
spatial dependence in contracting out decisions, we draw upon a cross-sectional dataset that 
does not enable us to fully tease out the causal effects of changes in institutional, ideological 
and political influences on contracting behaviour. Unfortunately, due to commercial 
confidentiality restrictions it was not possible for us to measure management type on an 
annual basis on this occasion. Panel data incorporating information on annual expenditure on 
contractors and on the award of new contracts and the termination of old ones would 
undoubtedly enable the role of geographical proximity in contracting behaviour to be 
investigated in even more depth.  
Second, our study examines contracting out at a time when regulatory pressure on 
local governments to consider contracting services out was particularly strong. It would be 
interesting to undertake a similar study in circumstances where regulatory pressure was more 
diffuse, and public organizations’ benchmarking less defensive. Thirdly, it is possible that 
unmeasured confounders correlated with geographical distance could be responsible for our 
results. For example, personnel movements between neighbouring local governments may 
influence contracting out decisions, and spillover effects related to supplier availability and 
competitiveness may be important. While the effects of personnel movements on contracting 
are difficult to measure, and the inclusion of an urban/rural variable may capture supplier 
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spillover effects, more research is required to tease out the causal mechanisms fully, 
especially in-depth case studies involving interviews with key actors. Finally, the 2000’s 
were a time of fiscal plenty in the English local government system, and it is quite 
conceivable that the determinants of contracting out may differ in the wake of the severe 
budget cuts carried out in the past few years.  
In sum, our study has highlighted the role that institutional factors play in shaping 
decision-making in the public sector, identifying isomorphic pressures that underpin the 
decision to contract services out. It has also illustrated the potential for other non-economic 
motives to influence the choice of contractor. Further research comparing the importance of 
institutional and non-economic motives for contracting out and for the choice of contractor 
would add vital knowledge on the forces that shape decision-making in public organizations. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
Variable All districts  (335) Districts contracting out  (170) 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Contracting out 0.507 0.501 - - 
Commercial firm - - 0.453 0.499 
Labour majority 0.069 0.253 0.065 0.247 
Labour votes 25.524 14.017 24.665 14.196 
Log (service spend) 5.676 1.081 5.709 1.099 
Deprivation   20.979 10.134 20.315 10.393 
Social class diversity 8762.87 117.48 8768.51 102.42 
Ethnic diversity 1656.794 1723.917 1959.812 1987.716 
Urban 0.597 0.491 0.600 0.491 
Log (population) 11.715 0.527 11.720 0.487 
Population growth 0.739 0.793 0.815 0.818 
Note: To deal with non-normal distributions of the variables measuring population and service needs we use their logged 
values in the regression models.  
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Table 2 Probit estimates of the choice of management model for public leisure services  
 Contracting out vs In-house Commercial firm vs not-for-profit 
 Probit model SAR Probit model Probit model SAR Probit model 
 Coeff. S.E. p-level Post.  
Mean 
Posterior 
SD 
p-level Coeff. S.E. p-level Post.  
Mean 
Posterior 
SD 
p-level 
Labour majority -0.028 0.294 0.925 0.180 0.243 0.230 -0.136 0.490 0.781 -0.435 0.409 0.142 
Labour votes -0.005 0.007 0.513 -0.006 0.008 0.218 -0.025 0.012 0.036 -0.020 0.012 0.056 
log(spending per 
capita) 0.035 0.117 0.765 0.021 0.117 0.427 -0.111 0.190 0.560 -0.081 0.191 0.330 
Deprivation rate  -0.010 0.011 0.342 -0.007 0.010 0.257 -0.014 0.015 0.369 -0.007 0.017 0.329 
Social class diversity 0.000 0.001 0.827 0.000 0.001 0.334 -0.001 0.001 0.333 -0.001 0.001 0.090 
Ethnic diversity 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.014 -0.000 0.000 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.231 
Urban 0.017 0.185 0.927 -0.012 0.186 0.477 0.566 0.284 0.047 0.530 0.291 0.034 
log(population) -0.168 0.199 0.399 -0.139 0.199 0.245 0.188 0.338 0.579 0.135 0.336 0.345 
Population growth 0.088 0.094 0.347 0.085 0.095 0.187 0.232 0.135 0.087 0.188 0.141 0.091 
Spatial lag (ρ) 
  
 0.390 0.151 0.012    0.249 0.226 0.132 
Log Likelihood -222.77 
 
 
  
 -104.23 
 
    
Estimation Method ML   MCMC   ML   MCMC   
Observations 335 
 
 335 
 
 170 
 
 170 
 
 
Notes: To operationalize the spatial weighting matrix, the Bayesian posterior probabilities point to a model with 17 nearest neighbours for the full sample  and 15 
nearest neighbours in the case of those municipalities contracting out. 
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Figure 1 English local governments’ leisure service provision, 2007 
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Figure 2 Posterior densities for contracting vs in-house. 
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Figure 3 Posterior densities for commercial firm vs not-for-profit. 
 
 
